Provided by: libcrypt-dev_4.4.38-1_amd64 bug

NAME

       crypt, crypt_r, crypt_rn, crypt_ra — passphrase hashing

LIBRARY

       Crypt Library (libcrypt, -lcrypt)

SYNOPSIS

       #include <crypt.h>

       char *
       crypt(const char *phrase, const char *setting);

       char *
       crypt_r(const char *phrase, const char *setting, struct crypt_data *data);

       char *
       crypt_rn(const char *phrase, const char *setting, struct crypt_data *data, int size);

       char *
       crypt_ra(const char *phrase, const char *setting, void **data, int *size);

DESCRIPTION

       The crypt, crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra functions irreversibly “hash” phrase for storage in the system
       password  database  (shadow(5))  using  a cryptographic “hashing method.” The result of this operation is
       called a “hashed passphrase” or just a “hash.” Hashing methods are described in crypt(5).

       setting controls which hashing method to use, and also supplies various parameters to the chosen  method,
       most importantly a random “salt” which ensures that no two stored hashes are the same, even if the phrase
       strings are the same.

       The data argument to crypt_r is a structure of type struct crypt_data.  It has at least these fields:

             struct crypt_data {
                 char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
                 char setting[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
                 char input[CRYPT_MAX_PASSPHRASE_SIZE];
                 char initialized;
             };

       Upon  a successful return from crypt_r, the hashed passphrase will be stored in output.  Applications are
       encouraged, but not required, to use the input and setting fields to store the  strings  that  they  will
       pass  as input phrase and setting to crypt_r.  This will make it easier to erase all sensitive data after
       it is no longer needed.

       The initialized field must be set to zero before the first time a struct crypt_data object is first  used
       in  a  call  to crypt_r().  We recommend zeroing the entire object, not just initialized and not just the
       documented fields, before the first use.  (Of course, do this before  storing  anything  in  setting  and
       input.)

       The  data  argument  to  crypt_rn should also point to a struct crypt_data object, and size should be the
       size of that object, cast to int.  When used with crypt_rn, the entire data object (except for the  input
       and  setting fields) must be zeroed before its first use; this is not just a recommendation, as it is for
       crypt_r.  Otherwise, the fields of the object have the same uses that they do for crypt_r.

       On the first call to crypt_ra, data should be the address of a void * variable  set  to  NULL,  and  size
       should  be  the  address  of an int variable set to zero.  crypt_ra will allocate and initialize a struct
       crypt_data object, using malloc(3), and write its address and size into the variables pointed to by  data
       and  size.   These can be reused in subsequent calls.  After the application is done hashing passphrases,
       it should deallocate the struct crypt_data object using free(3).

RETURN VALUES

       Upon successful completion, crypt, crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra return a pointer  to  a  string  which
       encodes  both  the  hashed  passphrase,  and  the  settings  that were used to encode it.  This string is
       directly usable as setting in other calls to crypt, crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra,  and  as  prefix  in
       calls to crypt_gensalt, crypt_gensalt_rn, and crypt_gensalt_ra.  It will be entirely printable ASCII, and
       will  not  contain whitespace or the characters ‘:’, ‘;’, ‘*’, ‘!’, or ‘\’.  See crypt(5) for more detail
       on the format of hashed passphrases.

       crypt places its result in a static storage area, which will be overwritten by subsequent calls to crypt.
       It is not safe to call crypt from multiple threads simultaneously.

       crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra place their result in the output field of their  data  argument.   It  is
       safe  to  call  them  from multiple threads simultaneously, as long as a separate data object is used for
       each thread.

       Upon error, crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra write an invalid hash to  the  output  field  of  their  data
       argument,  and crypt writes an invalid hash to its static storage area.  This string will be shorter than
       13 characters, will begin with a ‘*’, and will not compare equal to setting.

       Upon error, crypt_rn and crypt_ra return a null pointer.  crypt_r  and  crypt  may  also  return  a  null
       pointer,  or  they  may  return  a pointer to the invalid hash, depending on how libcrypt was configured.
       (The option to return the invalid hash is for compatibility with old applications that assume that  crypt
       cannot return a null pointer.  See “PORTABILITY NOTES” below.)

       All  four  functions  set  errno  when  they  fail.   When  the  functions succeed, the value of errno is
       unspecified and must not be relied upon.

ERRORS

       EINVAL             setting is invalid, or requests a hashing method that is not supported.

       ERANGE             phrase is too long  (more  than  CRYPT_MAX_PASSPHRASE_SIZE  characters;  some  hashing
                          methods may have lower limits).
                          crypt_rn only: size is too small for the hashing method requested by setting.

       ENOMEM             Failed to allocate internal scratch memory.
                          crypt_ra only: failed to allocate memory for data.

       ENOSYS or EOPNOTSUPP
                          Hashing  passphrases  is  not  supported  at  all on this installation, or the hashing
                          method requested by setting is not supported.  These error codes are not used by  this
                          version of libcrypt, but may be encountered on other systems.

PORTABILITY NOTES

       crypt is included in POSIX, but crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra are not part of any standard.

       POSIX  does  not  specify  any  hashing  methods,  and does not require hashed passphrases to be portable
       between systems.  In practice, hashed passphrases are portable  as  long  as  both  systems  support  the
       hashing  method  that  was  used.  However, the set of supported hashing methods varies considerably from
       system to system.

       The behavior of crypt on errors isn't well standardized.  Some implementations simply can't fail  (except
       by crashing the program), others return a null pointer or a fixed string.  Most implementations don't set
       errno,  but some do.  POSIX specifies returning a null pointer and setting errno, but it defines only one
       possible error, ENOSYS, in the case where crypt is not supported at all.  Some older applications are not
       prepared  to  handle  null  pointers  returned  by  crypt.   The  behavior  described  above   for   this
       implementation,  setting  errno  and  returning an invalid hash different from setting, is chosen to make
       these applications fail closed when an error occurs.

       Due to historical restrictions on the export of cryptographic software from the USA, crypt is an optional
       POSIX component.  Applications should therefore be prepared for crypt not to be available, or  to  always
       fail (setting errno to ENOSYS) at runtime.

       POSIX  specifies  that crypt is declared in <unistd.h>, but only if the macro _XOPEN_CRYPT is defined and
       has a value greater than or equal to zero.  Since libcrypt  does  not  provide  <unistd.h>,  it  declares
       crypt, crypt_r, crypt_rn, and crypt_ra in <crypt.h> instead.

       On  a  minority  of  systems  (notably  recent  versions of Solaris), crypt uses a thread-specific static
       storage buffer, which makes it safe to call from multiple threads simultaneously, but  does  not  prevent
       each call within a thread from overwriting the results of the previous one.

BUGS

       Some  implementations of crypt, upon error, return an invalid hash that is stored in a read-only location
       or only initialized once, which means that it is only safe to erase the buffer pointed to  by  the  crypt
       return value if an error did not occur.

       struct  crypt_data  may be quite large (32kB in this implementation of libcrypt; over 128kB in some other
       implementations).  This is large enough that it may be unwise to allocate it on the stack.

       Some recently designed hashing methods need even more scratch memory, but the crypt_r interface makes  it
       impossible  to  change the size of struct crypt_data without breaking binary compatibility.  The crypt_rn
       interface could accommodate larger allocations for specific hashing methods, but the caller  of  crypt_rn
       has  no  way  of  knowing how much memory to allocate.  crypt_ra does the allocation itself, but can only
       make a single call to malloc(3).

ATTRIBUTES

       For an explanation of the terms used in this section, see attributes(7).
       ┌─────────────────────────────┬───────────────┬──────────────────────┐
       │ InterfaceAttributeValue                │
       ├─────────────────────────────┼───────────────┼──────────────────────┤
       │ crypt                       │ Thread safety │ MT-Unsafe race:crypt │
       ├─────────────────────────────┼───────────────┼──────────────────────┤
       │ crypt_r, crypt_rn, crypt_ra │ Thread safety │ MT-Safe              │
       └─────────────────────────────┴───────────────┴──────────────────────┘

HISTORY

       A rotor-based crypt function appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX.  The “traditional”  DES-based  crypt  first
       appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.

       crypt_r originates with the GNU C Library.  There's also a crypt_r function on HP-UX and MKS Toolkit, but
       the prototypes and semantics differ.

       crypt_rn and crypt_ra originate with the Openwall project.

SEE ALSO

       crypt_gensalt(3),   getpass(3),   getpwent(3),   shadow(3),  login(1),  passwd(1),  crypt(5),  passwd(5),
       shadow(5), pam(8)

Openwall Project                                October 11, 2017                                        CRYPT(3)