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NAME

       random, urandom - kernel random number source devices

SYNOPSIS

       #include <linux/random.h>

       int ioctl(fd, RNDrequest, param);

DESCRIPTION

       The  character  special  files  /dev/random  and  /dev/urandom  (present  since  Linux 1.3.30) provide an
       interface to the kernel's random number generator.  The file /dev/random has major device  number  1  and
       minor device number 8.  The file /dev/urandom has major device number 1 and minor device number 9.

       The  random  number  generator  gathers environmental noise from device drivers and other sources into an
       entropy pool.  The generator also keeps an estimate of the number of bits of noise in the  entropy  pool.
       From this entropy pool, random numbers are created.

       Linux  3.17  and  later  provides  the simpler and safer getrandom(2) interface which requires no special
       files; see the getrandom(2) manual page for details.

       When read, the /dev/urandom device returns random bytes using a pseudorandom number generator seeded from
       the entropy pool.  Reads from this device do not block (i.e., the CPU is not yielded), but can  incur  an
       appreciable delay when requesting large amounts of data.

       When  read  during  early  boot  time,  /dev/urandom  may  return  data  prior  to the entropy pool being
       initialized.  If this is of concern in your application, use getrandom(2) or /dev/random instead.

       The /dev/random device is a legacy  interface  which  dates  back  to  a  time  where  the  cryptographic
       primitives  used  in  the  implementation of /dev/urandom were not widely trusted.  It will return random
       bytes only within the estimated number of bits of fresh noise in the entropy pool, blocking if necessary.
       /dev/random is suitable for applications that need high quality randomness, and can afford  indeterminate
       delays.

       When the entropy pool is empty, reads from /dev/random will block until additional environmental noise is
       gathered.   Since  Linux  5.6,  the O_NONBLOCK flag is ignored as /dev/random will no longer block except
       during early boot process.  In earlier versions, if open(2) is called for /dev/random with the O_NONBLOCK
       flag, a subsequent read(2) will not block if the requested number of bytes is  not  available.   Instead,
       the  available bytes are returned.  If no byte is available, read(2) will return -1 and errno will be set
       to EAGAIN.

       The O_NONBLOCK flag has no effect when  opening  /dev/urandom.   When  calling  read(2)  for  the  device
       /dev/urandom,  reads  of  up  to  256  bytes  will  return as many bytes as are requested and will not be
       interrupted by a signal handler.  Reads with a buffer over this limit may return less than the  requested
       number of bytes or fail with the error EINTR, if interrupted by a signal handler.

       Since Linux 3.16, a read(2) from /dev/urandom will return at most 32 MB.  A read(2) from /dev/random will
       return at most 512 bytes (340 bytes before Linux 2.6.12).

       Writing  to /dev/random or /dev/urandom will update the entropy pool with the data written, but this will
       not result in a higher entropy count.  This means that it will impact the contents read from both  files,
       but it will not make reads from /dev/random faster.

   Usage
       The  /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and /dev/urandom is preferred and sufficient
       in all use cases, with the exception of applications which require randomness during early boot time; for
       these applications, getrandom(2) must be used instead, because it will block until the  entropy  pool  is
       initialized.

       If  a  seed  file  is  saved  across reboots as recommended below, the output is cryptographically secure
       against attackers without local root access as soon as it is reloaded in the boot sequence, and perfectly
       adequate for network encryption session keys.  (All major Linux distributions have saved  the  seed  file
       across  reboots since 2000 at least.)  Since reads from /dev/random may block, users will usually want to
       open it in nonblocking mode (or perform a read with timeout), and provide some sort of user  notification
       if the desired entropy is not immediately available.

   Configuration
       If  your  system does not have /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created with the
       following commands:

           mknod -m 666 /dev/random c 1 8
           mknod -m 666 /dev/urandom c 1 9
           chown root:root /dev/random /dev/urandom

       When a Linux system starts up without much operator interaction, the entropy pool  may  be  in  a  fairly
       predictable  state.   This reduces the actual amount of noise in the entropy pool below the estimate.  In
       order to counteract this effect, it helps to carry entropy pool information across shut-downs and  start-
       ups.   To  do  this, add the lines to an appropriate script which is run during the Linux system start-up
       sequence:

           echo "Initializing random number generator..."
           random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
           # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
           # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
           if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
               cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
           else
               touch $random_seed
           fi
           chmod 600 $random_seed
           poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
           [ -r $poolfile ] && bits=$(cat $poolfile) || bits=4096
           bytes=$(expr $bits / 8)
           dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes

       Also, add the following lines in an appropriate script which is run during the Linux system shutdown:

           # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
           # Save the whole entropy pool
           echo "Saving random seed..."
           random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
           touch $random_seed
           chmod 600 $random_seed
           poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
           [ -r $poolfile ] && bits=$(cat $poolfile) || bits=4096
           bytes=$(expr $bits / 8)
           dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes

       In the above examples, we assume Linux 2.6.0 or later, where /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize returns the
       size of the entropy pool in bits (see below).

   /proc interfaces
       The files in the directory  /proc/sys/kernel/random  (present  since  Linux  2.3.16)  provide  additional
       information about the /dev/random device:

       entropy_avail
              This read-only file gives the available entropy, in bits.  This will be a number in the range 0 to
              4096.

       poolsize
              This  file  gives  the  size  of  the entropy pool.  The semantics of this file vary across kernel
              versions:

              Linux 2.4:
                     This file gives the size of the entropy pool in bytes.  Normally, this file will  have  the
                     value  512,  but  it is writable, and can be changed to any value for which an algorithm is
                     available.  The choices are 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, or 2048.

              Linux 2.6 and later:
                     This file is read-only, and gives the size of the entropy pool in bits.   It  contains  the
                     value 4096.

       read_wakeup_threshold
              This  file  contains  the  number  of  bits of entropy required for waking up processes that sleep
              waiting for entropy from /dev/random.  The default is 64.

       write_wakeup_threshold
              This file contains the number of bits of entropy below which  we  wake  up  processes  that  do  a
              select(2)  or  poll(2) for write access to /dev/random.  These values can be changed by writing to
              the files.

       uuid and boot_id
              These read-only files  contain  random  strings  like  6fd5a44b-35f4-4ad4-a9b9-6b9be13e1fe9.   The
              former is generated afresh for each read, the latter was generated once.

   ioctl(2) interface
       The  following  ioctl(2)  requests  are  defined  on  file descriptors connected to either /dev/random or
       /dev/urandom.  All  requests  performed  will  interact  with  the  input  entropy  pool  impacting  both
       /dev/random  and  /dev/urandom.   The  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capability  is  required  for  all  requests except
       RNDGETENTCNT.

       RNDGETENTCNT
              Retrieve the entropy count of the input pool, the contents will be the same as  the  entropy_avail
              file under proc.  The result will be stored in the int pointed to by the argument.

       RNDADDTOENTCNT
              Increment  or  decrement  the  entropy  count  of  the  input  pool by the value pointed to by the
              argument.

       RNDGETPOOL
              Removed in Linux 2.6.9.

       RNDADDENTROPY
              Add some additional entropy to the input pool, incrementing the entropy count.  This differs  from
              writing  to  /dev/random  or  /dev/urandom,  which  only adds some data but does not increment the
              entropy count.  The following structure is used:

                  struct rand_pool_info {
                      int    entropy_count;
                      int    buf_size;
                      __u32  buf[0];
                  };

              Here entropy_count is the value added to (or subtracted from) the entropy count, and  buf  is  the
              buffer of size buf_size which gets added to the entropy pool.

       RNDZAPENTCNT
       RNDCLEARPOOL
              Zero the entropy count of all pools and add some system data (such as wall clock) to the pools.

FILES

       /dev/random
       /dev/urandom

NOTES

       For  an  overview  and  comparison  of  the various interfaces that can be used to obtain randomness, see
       random(7).

BUGS

       During early boot time, reads from  /dev/urandom  may  return  data  prior  to  the  entropy  pool  being
       initialized.

SEE ALSO

       mknod(1), getrandom(2), random(7)

       RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security"

Linux man-pages 6.7                                2023-10-31                                          random(4)