Provided by: apparmor_3.0.4-2ubuntu2.4_amd64 bug

NAME

       AppArmor - kernel enhancement to confine programs to a limited set of resources.

DESCRIPTION

       AppArmor is a kernel enhancement to confine programs to a limited set of resources. AppArmor's unique
       security model is to bind access control attributes to programs rather than to users.

       AppArmor confinement is provided via profiles loaded into the kernel via apparmor_parser(8), typically
       through the /etc/init.d/apparmor SysV initscript, which is used like this:

               # /etc/init.d/apparmor start
               # /etc/init.d/apparmor stop
               # /etc/init.d/apparmor restart

       AppArmor can operate in two modes: enforcement, and complain or learning:

       •   enforcement  -   Profiles loaded in enforcement mode will result in enforcement of the policy defined
           in the profile as well as reporting policy violation attempts to syslogd.

       •   complain - Profiles loaded in  "complain" mode will not enforce  policy.   Instead,  it  will  report
           policy  violation  attempts. This mode is convenient for developing profiles. To manage complain mode
           for individual profiles the utilities aa-complain(8) and aa-enforce(8) can be used.  These  utilities
           take a program name as an argument.

       Profiles  are  traditionally  stored  in files in /etc/apparmor.d/ under filenames with the convention of
       replacing the / in pathnames with . (except for the root /) so profiles are easier to  manage  (e.g.  the
       /usr/sbin/nscd profile would be named usr.sbin.nscd).

       Profiles  are  applied  to  a process at exec(3) time (as seen through the execve(2) system call): once a
       profile is loaded for a program, that program will be confined on the  next  exec(3).  If  a  process  is
       already  running  under  a  profile, when one replaces that profile in the kernel, the updated profile is
       applied immediately to that process.  On the other hand, a process that  is  already  running  unconfined
       cannot be confined.

       AppArmor  supports the Linux kernel's securityfs filesystem, and makes available the list of the profiles
       currently loaded; to mount the filesystem:

               # mount -tsecurityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security
               $ cat /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/profiles
               /usr/bin/mutt
               /usr/bin/gpg
                  ...

       Normally, the initscript will mount securityfs if it has not already been done.

       AppArmor also restricts what privileged operations a confined process may execute, even if the process is
       running as root. A confined process cannot call the following system calls:

               create_module(2) delete_module(2) init_module(2) ioperm(2)
               iopl(2) ptrace(2) reboot(2) setdomainname(2)
               sethostname(2) swapoff(2) swapon(2) sysctl(2)

ERRORS

       When a confined process tries to access a file it does not have permission to  access,  the  kernel  will
       report a message through audit, similar to:

               audit(1386511672.612:238): apparmor="DENIED" operation="exec"
                 parent=7589 profile="/tmp/sh" name="/bin/uname" pid=7605
                 comm="sh" requested_mask="x" denied_mask="x" fsuid=0 ouid=0

               audit(1386511672.613:239): apparmor="DENIED" operation="open"
                 parent=7589 profile="/tmp/sh" name="/bin/uname" pid=7605
                 comm="sh" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=0 ouid=0

               audit(1386511772.804:246): apparmor="DENIED" operation="capable"
                 parent=7246 profile="/tmp/sh" pid=7589 comm="sh" pid=7589
                 comm="sh" capability=2  capname="dac_override"

       The  permissions  requested  by the process are described in the operation= and denied_mask= (for files -
       capabilities etc. use a slightly different log format).  The "name" and process id of the running program
       are reported, as well as the profile name including any "hat" that may  be  active,  separated  by  "//".
       ("Name" is in quotes, because the process name is limited to 15 bytes; it is the same as reported through
       the Berkeley process accounting.)

       For  confined  processes  running under a profile that has been loaded in complain mode, enforcement will
       not take place and the log messages reported to audit will be of the form:

               audit(1386512577.017:275): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open"
                 parent=8012 profile="/usr/bin/du" name="/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/"
                 pid=8049 comm="du" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

               audit(1386512577.017:276): apparmor="ALLOWED" operation="open"
                 parent=8012 profile="/usr/bin/du" name="/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/"
                 pid=8049 comm="du" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1000 ouid=0

       If the userland auditd is not running, the kernel will send audit events to klogd; klogd  will  send  the
       messages  to  syslog,  which will log the messages with the KERN facility. Thus, REJECTING and PERMITTING
       messages  may  go  to  either  /var/log/audit/audit.log  or  /var/log/messages,  depending   upon   local
       configuration.

DEBUGGING

       AppArmor provides a few facilities to log more information, which can help debugging profiles.

   Enable debug mode
       When  debug  mode  is  enabled,  AppArmor  will  log  a  few  extra  messages to dmesg (not via the audit
       subsystem). For example, the logs will tell whether environment scrubbing has been applied.

       To enable debug mode, run:

               echo 1 > /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/debug

   Turn off deny audit quieting
       By default, operations that trigger "deny" rules are not logged.  This is called deny audit quieting.

       To turn off deny audit quieting, run:

               echo -n noquiet >/sys/module/apparmor/parameters/audit

   Force audit mode
       AppArmor can log a message for every operation that triggers a rule configured in  the  policy.  This  is
       called force audit mode.

       Warning!  Force  audit  mode  can  be  extremely  noisy even for a single profile, let alone when enabled
       globally.

       To set a specific profile in force audit mode, add the "audit" flag:

               profile foo flags=(audit) { ... }

       To enable force audit mode globally, run:

               echo -n all > /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/audit

       If auditd is not running, to avoid losing too many of the extra log messages, you  will  likely  have  to
       turn off rate limiting by doing:

               echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/printk_ratelimit

       But even then the kernel ring buffer may overflow and you might lose messages.

       Else, if auditd is running, see auditd(8) and auditd.conf(5).

FILES

       /etc/init.d/apparmor
       /etc/apparmor.d/
       /var/lib/apparmor/
       /var/log/audit/audit.log
       /var/log/messages

SEE ALSO

       apparmor_parser(8),     aa_change_hat(2),     apparmor.d(5),    aa-autodep(1),    clean(1),    auditd(8),
       aa-unconfined(8), aa-enforce(1), aa-complain(1), and <https://wiki.apparmor.net>.

AppArmor 3.0.4                                     2024-03-06                                        APPARMOR(7)