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NAME

       openat2 - open and possibly create a file (extended)

SYNOPSIS

       #include <sys/types.h>
       #include <sys/stat.h>
       #include <fcntl.h>
       #include <linux/openat2.h>

       long openat2(int dirfd, const char *pathname,
                   struct open_how *how, size_t size);

       Note: There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES.

DESCRIPTION

       The openat2() system call is an extension of openat(2) and provides a superset of its functionality.

       The openat2() system call opens the file specified by pathname.  If the specified file does not exist, it
       may optionally (if O_CREAT is specified in how.flags) be created.

       As  with  openat(2), if pathname is a relative pathname, then it is interpreted relative to the directory
       referred to by the file descriptor dirfd (or the current working directory of  the  calling  process,  if
       dirfd is the special value AT_FDCWD).  If pathname is an absolute pathname, then dirfd is ignored (unless
       how.resolve contains RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, in which case pathname is resolved relative to dirfd).

       Rather  than  taking a single flags argument, an extensible structure (how) is passed to allow for future
       extensions.  The size argument must be specified as sizeof(struct open_how).

   The open_how structure
       The how argument specifies how pathname should be opened, and acts as a superset of the  flags  and  mode
       arguments to openat(2).  This argument is a pointer to a structure of the following form:

           struct open_how {
               u64 flags;    /* O_* flags */
               u64 mode;     /* Mode for O_{CREAT,TMPFILE} */
               u64 resolve;  /* RESOLVE_* flags */
               /* ... */
           };

       Any  future  extensions  to  openat2() will be implemented as new fields appended to the above structure,
       with a zero value in a new field resulting in the kernel behaving as though that extension field was  not
       present.    Therefore,   the   caller   must  zero-fill  this  structure  on  initialization.   (See  the
       "Extensibility" section of the NOTES for more detail on why this is necessary.)

       The fields of the open_how structure are as follows:

       flags  This field specifies the file creation and file status flags to use when opening the file.  All of
              the O_* flags defined for openat(2) are valid openat2() flag values.

              Whereas openat(2) ignores unknown bits in its  flags  argument,  openat2()  returns  an  error  if
              unknown or conflicting flags are specified in how.flags.

       mode   This  field  specifies the mode for the new file, with identical semantics to the mode argument of
              openat(2).

              Whereas openat(2) ignores bits other than those in the range 07777 in its mode argument, openat2()
              returns an error if how.mode contains bits other than 07777.  Similarly, an error is  returned  if
              openat2() is called with a nonzero how.mode and how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

       resolve
              This  is  a  bit-mask  of  flags  that  modify the way in which all components of pathname will be
              resolved.  (See path_resolution(7) for background information.)

              The primary use case for these flags is to allow trusted programs to restrict how untrusted  paths
              (or  paths  inside  untrusted  directories)  are  resolved.   The full list of resolve flags is as
              follows:

              RESOLVE_BENEATH
                     Do not permit the path resolution to succeed if any component of the resolution  is  not  a
                     descendant  of  the directory indicated by dirfd.  This causes absolute symbolic links (and
                     absolute values of pathname) to be rejected.

                     Currently, this flag also disables magic-link resolution (see below).   However,  this  may
                     change  in  the future.  Therefore, to ensure that magic links are not resolved, the caller
                     should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

              RESOLVE_IN_ROOT
                     Treat the directory referred to by dirfd as the root directory  while  resolving  pathname.
                     Absolute  symbolic  links  are  interpreted  relative  to  dirfd.  If a prefix component of
                     pathname equates to dirfd, then an immediately following .. component likewise  equates  to
                     dirfd  (just as /.. is traditionally equivalent to /).  If pathname is an absolute path, it
                     is also interpreted relative to dirfd.

                     The effect  of  this  flag  is  as  though  the  calling  process  had  used  chroot(2)  to
                     (temporarily)  modify its root directory (to the directory referred to by dirfd).  However,
                     unlike  chroot(2)  (which  changes  the  filesystem  root  permanently  for   a   process),
                     RESOLVE_IN_ROOT  allows  a  program  to  efficiently restrict path resolution on a per-open
                     basis.

                     Currently, this flag also disables magic-link resolution.  However, this may change in  the
                     future.   Therefore,  to  ensure  that  magic  links  are  not  resolved, the caller should
                     explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

              RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS
                     Disallow all magic-link resolution during path resolution.

                     Magic links are symbolic link-like objects that are most notably found in proc(5); examples
                     include /proc/[pid]/exe and /proc/[pid]/fd/*.  (See symlink(7) for more details.)

                     Unknowingly opening magic links can be risky for some applications.  Examples of such risks
                     include the following:

                     • If the process opening a  pathname  is  a  controlling  process  that  currently  has  no
                       controlling   terminal   (see   credentials(7)),   then   opening  a  magic  link  inside
                       /proc/[pid]/fd that happens to refer to a terminal would cause the process to  acquire  a
                       controlling terminal.

                     • In  a containerized environment, a magic link inside /proc may refer to an object outside
                       the container, and thus may provide a means to escape from the container.

                     Because of such risks, an application may prefer to disable magic link resolution using the
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS flag.

                     If the trailing component (i.e.,  basename)  of  pathname  is  a  magic  link,  how.resolve
                     contains  RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and how.flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then an
                     O_PATH file descriptor referencing the magic link will be returned.

              RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS
                     Disallow resolution  of  symbolic  links  during  path  resolution.   This  option  implies
                     RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

                     If  the  trailing  component  (i.e.,  basename) of pathname is a symbolic link, how.resolve
                     contains RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and how.flags contains both O_PATH and  O_NOFOLLOW,  then  an
                     O_PATH file descriptor referencing the symbolic link will be returned.

                     Note  that  the  effect  of  the  RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS  flag, which affects the treatment of
                     symbolic links in all of the components  of  pathname,  differs  from  the  effect  of  the
                     O_NOFOLLOW  file creation flag (in how.flags), which affects the handling of symbolic links
                     only in the final component of pathname.

                     Applications that employ the RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS  flag  are  encouraged  to  make  its  use
                     configurable  (unless  it  is  used for a specific security purpose), as symbolic links are
                     very widely used by end-users.  Setting this flag indiscriminately—i.e., for  purposes  not
                     specifically related to security—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on
                     previously  functional  systems.  This may occur if, for example, a system pathname that is
                     used by an application is modified (e.g., in a new distribution release) so that a pathname
                     component (now) contains a symbolic link.

              RESOLVE_NO_XDEV
                     Disallow traversal of mount points during path  resolution  (including  all  bind  mounts).
                     Consequently,  pathname  must  either  be on the same mount as the directory referred to by
                     dirfd, or on the same mount as the current working  directory  if  dirfd  is  specified  as
                     AT_FDCWD.

                     Applications  that  employ  the  RESOLVE_NO_XDEV  flag  are  encouraged  to  make  its  use
                     configurable (unless it is used for a specific security purpose), as bind mounts are widely
                     used by end-users.  Setting this flag indiscriminately—i.e., for purposes not  specifically
                     related  to  security—for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on previously
                     functional systems.  This may occur if, for example, a system pathname that is used  by  an
                     application  is modified (e.g., in a new distribution release) so that a pathname component
                     (now) contains a bind mount.

              If any bits other than those listed above are set in how.resolve, an error is returned.

RETURN VALUE

       On success, a new file descriptor is returned.  On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS

       The set of errors returned by openat2() includes all of the errors returned by openat(2), as well as  the
       following additional errors:

       E2BIG  An  extension  that  this  kernel does not support was specified in how.  (See the "Extensibility"
              section of NOTES for more detail on how extensions are handled.)

       EAGAIN how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and the kernel  could  not  ensure
              that a ".." component didn't escape (due to a race condition or potential attack).  The caller may
              choose to retry the openat2() call.

       EINVAL An unknown flag or invalid value was specified in how.

       EINVAL mode is nonzero, but how.flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

       EINVAL size was smaller than any known version of struct open_how.

       ELOOP  how.resolve  contains  RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and one of the path components was a symbolic link (or
              magic link).

       ELOOP  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and one of the path components was a magic link.

       EXDEV  how.resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and an escape from the root during
              path resolution was detected.

       EXDEV  how.resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_XDEV, and a path component crosses a mount point.

VERSIONS

       openat2() first appeared in Linux 5.6.

CONFORMING TO

       This system call is Linux-specific.

       The semantics of RESOLVE_BENEATH were modeled after FreeBSD's O_BENEATH.

NOTES

       Glibc does not provide a wrapper for this system call; call it using syscall(2).

   Extensibility
       In order to allow for future extensibility, openat2() requires the user-space application to specify  the
       size  of  the  open_how  structure that it is passing.  By providing this information, it is possible for
       openat2() to provide both forwards- and backwards-compatibility, with size acting as an implicit  version
       number.  (Because new extension fields will always be appended, the structure size will always increase.)
       This   extensibility   design   is   very  similar  to  other  system  calls  such  as  sched_setattr(2),
       perf_event_open(2), and clone3(2).

       If we let usize be the size of the structure as specified by the user-space application, and ksize be the
       size of the structure which the kernel supports, then there are three cases to consider:

       • If ksize equals usize, then there is no version mismatch and how can be used verbatim.

       • If ksize is larger than usize, then there are some extension fields that the kernel supports which  the
         user-space  application  is  unaware of.  Because a zero value in any added extension field signifies a
         no-op, the kernel treats all of the extension fields not provided  by  the  user-space  application  as
         having zero values.  This provides backwards-compatibility.

       • If  ksize  is smaller than usize, then there are some extension fields which the user-space application
         is aware of but which the kernel does not support.  Because any extension  field  must  have  its  zero
         values  signify a no-op, the kernel can safely ignore the unsupported extension fields if they are all-
         zero.  If any unsupported extension fields are nonzero, then -1 is returned and errno is set to  E2BIG.
         This provides forwards-compatibility.

       Because  the  definition  of  struct  open_how may change in the future (with new fields being added when
       system headers are updated), user-space applications should zero-fill  struct  open_how  to  ensure  that
       recompiling the program with new headers will not result in spurious errors at runtime.  The simplest way
       is to use a designated initializer:

           struct open_how how = { .flags = O_RDWR,
                                   .resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT };

       or explicitly using memset(3) or similar:

           struct open_how how;
           memset(&how, 0, sizeof(how));
           how.flags = O_RDWR;
           how.resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT;

       A  user-space application that wishes to determine which extensions the running kernel supports can do so
       by conducting a binary search on size with a structure which has every byte nonzero (to find the  largest
       value which doesn't produce an error of E2BIG).

SEE ALSO

       openat(2), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)

COLOPHON

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       information  about  reporting  bugs,  and  the  latest  version  of  this   page,   can   be   found   at
       https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.

Linux                                              2020-11-01                                         OPENAT2(2)